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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis research presents a framework that enhances security at the level of 
materialized views. Materialized views can be used for performance reasons in very large 
systems such as data warehouses or distributed systems, or for providing a filtered 
selection of data from a more general database. Existing proposed techniques provide 
rule-based access control for materialized views, however, the administration of such 
systems is time consuming and cumbersome in a large environment. This thesis presents 
a role-based access control schema for materialized views in which data authorization 
rules are associated with roles and defined in Datalog syntax in plain text files, a column 
level restriction is imposed on a materialized view based on a user assigned role, and a 
role conflict strategy is defined in which priority is given to each conflicting role in order 
to resolve role conflicts if a user is gaining authorization for permissions associated with 
conflicting roles at the same time. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Data Access Control has been considered a major issue in the information technology 
community. The main focus of researcher is to provide a mechanism to secure data, and 
provide the access of data based on identity and attributes of a known users or a process 
by using a reference monitor and specialized authorization rules. 
The authorization policies are defined to limit the access of data based on user attributes 
or role. Several different approaches have been proposed based on the requirements of 
different domains. There are some research works which are generic, and can be applied 
to any domain. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [24] is the leading access control 
model due to its flexible nature and ease of maintenance.   
Currently, data amount and availability is increasing rapidly; much of the data is stored 
on remote file systems. Materialized Views is another addition in Relational Database 
Management Systems. A materialized view takes a different approach in which the query 
result is cached as a concrete table that may be updated from the original base tables from 
time to time. This enables much more efficient access of data. It may be a local copy of 
data located remotely or a subset of the rows or columns of a table or join result, or may 
be a summary based on aggregations of a table’s data. 
Existing proposed techniques provide rule-based access control for materialized views 
[2][3], but to the best of our knowledge, the administration of such systems is time 
consuming and cumbersome in a large environment as administrators define rules for 
each user to control the access to materialized views. 
In this chapter, we give an introduction of existing data access control methods, 
Materialized View, Authorization View, and Query Rewriting. In last two sections, we 
describe the problem statement, and thesis contribution.  
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1.1 - Data Access Control Methods 
 
Several Data Access Control methods have been introduced by keeping in view the 
requirements of an organization, and the sensitivity of the data. In this section, we discuss 
different data access control methods.   
1.1.1 - Mandatory Access Control (MAC) 
 
Mandatory Access Control utilizes hard coded security rules. Rules are coded into an 
application or operating system. The security policy is centrally administered and can be 
override by the users, and it is applied to various resources, objects, and applications. The 
data classification of MAC security policy begins with sensitive, secret, and confidential, 
and next the classification of resources that will be making requests for data. MAC 
concept is incorporated mostly in military and governmental applications where high 
level security is required. 
The benefit of this model is that the rules are hard coded into software so there are very 
less chances of an administrative error or social engineering.  
The shortcoming of this model is that the rules are hard coded so it takes time to review 
and modify the rules as the requirements are changed. MAC is best suited for a group of 
users with similar needs.  
1.1.2 - Discretionary Access Control (DAC) 
 
Discretionary Access Control can be utilized as a centralized and distributed model. DAC 
centralized model is administered by an administrator or a team of administrators, who 
are responsible to make security policies and assign privileges as per policy, but this 
approach is time consuming, especially if the administrator is off or outsourced. In 
distributed approach, the data access is distributed to some responsible personnel such as 
managers, supervisors, or team. 
This approach provides a way to avoid delays as the administration of accounts is 
dispersed. 
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The shortcoming of this model is that the uniformity of data access for end-user with 
same job functions can be diminished as access of data is distributed at the discretion of 
the owner. 
1.1.3 - Role-based Access Control (RBAC) 
 
In this competitive environment, the risk of losing information is more for leading 
organization. MAC and DAC model secure data, but they have limitations. To overcome 
their shortcomings, RBAC has been proposed [24]. As Role Based Access controls are in 
existence in last 20 years, especially in UNIX and mainframe environments, but they lack 
some standards as each system use its own propriety elements. There was a need to 
design such a system which is standardized, scalable, logical in design, and non-system 
dependent. 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) started a project for unified 
standards of RBAC by integrating the existing model.  
In 1992 a model was introduced by David Ferraiolo and Rick Kuhn that attempted to 
meet the requirements of the scope and created a full-fledged RBAC solution.  
RBAC0 is the first proposed method in this series, this model consist of separation of 
duties and providing minimum privileges to each role. It doesn't have the hierarchy 
mechanism so the permissions were assigned directly to the users within a certain role or 
function.  
By considering the need of hierarchy as it exists in any organization such as Manager, 
Supervisor, and team members RBAC1 is introduced based on RBAC0. It provides a 
natural distribution of responsibilities within an organization that is usually layered as 
senior and junior roles. This layered security distribution method is suitable for large 
environments. 
Constraints are introduced in RBAC2 which offer more control over any network in large 
environments. Constraints help to enforce the policies while not having the hierarchy. 
Constraints work as limiters and ensure that the policies are being enforced. For instance, 
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if an organization wants to give administrative rights to one user or role, the constraints 
ensures that only one user has the system administration rights. 
Another purpose of constraints is to regulate the access by ensuring certain criteria is met. 
For instance, to gain the permissions of Senior Analyst role one must have the 
memberships of Junior Analyst role.  
Finally, constraints serve the purpose of separation of duties by limiting the users in a 
certain domain. 
RBAC3 is complete model of RBAC, and it consists of both hierarchy and constraints. 
Figure 1.1 represents RBAC architecture. 
Role
Session
session_roles
user_session
user_assignment
Permission
Assignment
OPS OBS
Permissions
 
Fig 1.1: RBAC Architecture (NIST solution) 
In RBAC3 constraints are used to regulate access on hierarchal structure. For instance, a 
programmer role is associated with a senior programmer role, and there are several senior 
programmers but a programmer role is associated only a specific senior programmer. As 
RBAC3 supports a hierarchal design, it provides ease of administration by allowing 
rights to flow down to subordinate objects. Figure 1.2 represents RBAC Hierarchal 
Structure. 
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User 1
IT Programmer
User 2
IT Programmer
User 3
IT Programmer
SR. ADMIN
ROLE
JR. ADMIN
ROLE
TECH
ROLE
NOT
NOT
Sr. Admin Inherits 
Jr. Admin capabilities
Jr. Admin Inherits 
Tech capabilities
 
Fig 1.2: RBAC Hierarchal Structure (NIST solution) 
Another benefit is the multiple roles which are associated with each other and provide 
better functionality to the users. RBAC3 constraints enforce separation of duties; it 
restricts the users to perform other tasks which are not in his job function. Figure 1.3 
represents RBAC Separation of Duties (SoD). 
Billing System
Payment System
Finance
Billing
Finance
Payment
User2
Finance
User1
Finance
NOT NOT
 
Fig 1.3: RBAC Separation of Duties (NIST solution) 
In Figure 1.3, ‘NOT’ represents that both the roles cannot be activated at the same time 
by the same user.  
RBAC3 is a complex method, but it is suitable for large environments where 
implementation and maintenance of other security models is time consuming with high 
cost.  
6 
 
RBAC3 provides all functionalities that a large organization requires, but implementation 
is complex due to its structure. Before implementing RBAC3, the organizational structure 
or roles must be well documented, otherwise, it can turn into a nightmare for an 
organization. 
RBAC3 has five elements as represented in Figure 1.4; they are related to each other in 
order to create level of permissions and constraints. 
USER
ROLE
PERMISSIONS
OPERATIONS
OBJECTS
Wishing to access the data
Determines user’s permissions
Grant to access the data
Read, write, modify, and delete.
Operations can also be function
within an application
Data and resources user tries to access
 
Fig 1.4: RBAC Elements (NIST solution) 
1.2 - Materialized View 
 
Materialized view is a replica of a table or tables which is created in a distributed 
environment where master table is located in a main database. Materialized views are 
created and deployed at remote locations in a distributed environment in order to ease the 
network load, and provide uninterrupted data extraction as it doesn’t require a dedicated 
network connection to the main database server. 
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Master Site Master Site
Master Site
Materialized
View
Site
 
Fig 1.5: Materialized view site architecture http://docs.oracle.com 
Materialized views can increase query execution performance in the following ways: 
 Pre-computed aggregations can be created to minimize expensive computations 
during query executions.  
 Tables can be pre-joined and resulting data can be stored in a materialized view. 
 Combinations of joins and aggregations can be stored for analysis purpose. 
Application that benefits from the creation/deployment of the materialized views: 
 Decision Support Systems 
 Data Marts 
 Data Warehouses 
 Online Analytical Processing (OLAP) 
 Data Mining Workloads 
A view is a temporary table that is created during run time, and discarded when the 
session is closed. A materialized view is a physical table that is stored in a database such 
as the traditional database tables. The creation process of the materialized view is 
different in each Database Management System (DBMS).  
Oracle supports read only, updatable, and writable materialized views [27]. Users cannot 
manipulate read only materialized views, but they can perform actions on writable and 
updatable materialized views. 
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Oracle offers several different types of materialized views in order to meet the different 
replication situation. 
a) Primary Key Materialized Views 
b) Object Materialized Views 
c) ROWID Materialized Views 
d) Complex Materialized Views 
 
a. Primary Key Materialized Views 
Primary Key Materialized Views are the default type materialized views. They are 
updatable and created as part of a materialized view group. The updatable materialized 
views must reside in a different database instead of the master replication group. Changes 
are occurred at row level as identified by the primary key value of the row.  
b. Object Materialized Views 
Object Materialized View is based on the object table and created using OF type clause. 
The structure is same as the object table and composed of row objects, and each row 
object is identified by the object identifier (OID) column. 
c. ROWID Materialized Views 
A ROWID materialized view is based on the physical row identifiers (rowids) of the rows 
in a master table. They are used with Oracle7 database.  
d. Complex Materialized Views 
There are certain restrictions which need to be observed during the creation of a 
materialized view, and if these restrictions are not followed then a materialized view is 
considered a complex materialized view, and it cannot be fast refreshed. 
In Microsoft SQL Server, materialized views are called indexed views, and the creation 
of materialized views is available in tutorials.  
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In open source database systems such as MySQL that doesn’t provide materialized view 
by itself. But it is easy to build materialized views manually or using some available APIs 
such as flexviews [28] which helps to create the materialized views and refresh them. 
1.3 - Authorization View  
 
Authorization view is a well-known database technique that provides a fine-grained 
access control [2][3][20]. It provides a way to restrict users to view only authorized data 
which is specified in the available authorization views for that particular user. 
Authorization views are logical tables that don’t contain any records. The structure of 
these views consists of the table name and the number of columns which are mentioned 
during the authorized view creation process. 
There are different approaches to define an authorization view. Motro [15] proposed a 
model in which database access is specified in terms of views. According to the authors, 
“a set of views is defined, and each user is granted permission to access one or more 
views”. Users query the database and database system derives views of the request that 
are views of the views to which the user has access permission, and then presents the 
available views.  
Motro [15] defines a view creation in following way: 
view ELP (EMPLOYEE.NAME, EMPLOYEE.TITLE, 
        PROJECT.NUMBER, PROJECT.BUDGET) 
where EMPLOYEE.NAME = ASSIGNMENT.E_NAME 
 And PROJECT.NUMBER = ASSIGNMENT.P_NO 
 And PROJECT.BUDGET ≥ 250,000 
 
Rizvi et al. [20] introduced parameterized authorization views. According to the authors, 
it is impractical to create and maintain the authorization views for each user when the 
database has thousands of users. Also, if there is a slight change in the authorization 
policy then a large number of views will be affected. Rizvi et al. [20] states that the 
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parameterized views are like the normal views, but there are some additional parameters 
such as user-id, time and user-location appearing in its definition.  
Rizvi et al. [20] defines a view creation in the following way: 
create authorization view Co-studentGrades as  
select Grades.* 
from Grades, Registered 
where Registered.student-id = $user-id 
and Grades.course-id = Registered.course-id 
 
Bahloul et al. [3] proposed an inference-based approach in order to control the access of 
Materialized Views. According to Bahloul et al. [3], their approach “facilitates the 
administration of access control rules to ensure the confidentiality of data at the level of 
materialized views”. The authors use authorization views to provide a fine-grained access 
control over the materialized views. In this approach, the authors propose the use of 
Datalog as a formal framework for expressing the access control rules. Datalog is a 
declarative programming language that is syntactically a subset of Prolog. It is used as a 
query language for deductive databases. Datalog is more expressive than SQL; it can 
perform multi-database queries with a cleaner syntax, and it facilitates re-use of SQL 
code snippets for frequent joins and formulas. In recent years, Datalog is used for data 
integration, data extraction, cloud computing, data analysis, and security.  
 
The authors [3] assume the existence of three types of symbols: variables, constants and 
predicate names. p(t1….tn) is a literal where p is a predicate name with arity n and each ti 
for 1≤ i ≤ n is either a constant or a variable.  
 
According to the authors, the logical sentence associated with the Datalog rule 
P(u) ← q1(u1),…,qn(un) is: 
∀x1.. xn(p(u1) ← q1(u1) ^…^ qn(un)). 
 
Bahloul et al. [3] states that the relations defined by deductive rules are called intentional 
relations. For example, 
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Info-Doc (Id-D, Dname, Dfname, Dspeciality) ←  
doctor (Id-D, Dname, Dfname, Dadr, Dphone, Dspeciality, 
Dsalary) 
 
is a rule that defines the (intentional) Info-Doc relation in terms of the (extensional) 
doctor relation. 
 
In the above example, the user is allowed to view doctor ID, last-name, first-name, and 
specialty from the available materialized view.  
1.4 - Query Rewriting 
 
The problem of answering queries using the views has recently received a significant 
attention due to data management problems. In order to solve such problems, query 
rewriting algorithms has been introduced. These algorithms rewrite the user query using 
the defined authorization views which are associated with traditional database tables or 
materialized views. A query is rewritten to take best advantage of summaries, joins or 
aggregations of base table that are found in materialized views 
There are several proposed query rewriting algorithms, we discuss Bucket algorithm [18] 
to understand the query rewriting process in the following paragraph. 
Bucket algorithm creates subgoal g in the original query, and then each subgoal g 
contains the views that include subgoals to which g can be mapped in a rewriting of the 
query. In second step, the algorithm consider conjunctive query rewriting, each consists 
of one conjunct from every bucket. The algorithm further checks whether it is contained 
or can be made to be contained with join predicates in the query. The result of the Bucket 
algorithm is the result of conjunctive query rewritings. 
Example: 
 
create authorization view MyGrades as  
select * from Grades where student-id = $user-id 
 
Let q be the query posed by the user. 
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q : select avg(grade) from Grades 
 
The system-modified query 
qʹ: select avg(grade) from MyGrades 
1.5 - Problem Statement 
 
In distributed environment, materialized views can be used to replicate data at distributed 
sites. Materialized views provide local access to data instead of accessing data from 
remote sites.  
In large organizations, materialized view site are created at remote destinations in order 
to reduce the network load and the load from the main database server. A user query is 
sent to the local materialized view database instead of main database server. Existing 
proposed techniques provide rule-based access control for materialized views; however, 
the administration of such systems is time consuming and cumbersome in a large 
environment where administrators define rules for each user to control the access to 
materialized views.  
In order to control the access of materialized view, we need a framework which provides 
a fine-grained access control to materialized view using the authorization view [3], and 
provides a Role-Based access instead of defining policies for each user. In our thesis 
research, we identified the problem of assigning authorization views to roles instead of 
defining for each user. We also noticed that if our framework allows the users to activate 
multiple roles in same session with different permissions, then we need to provide a 
strategy to resolve role conflicts that occur if a user is gaining authorization for 
permissions associated with conflicting roles at the same time. In our thesis research, we 
have identified the following problems: 
• How can we assign the authorization views to roles? 
• How can we impose a column level restriction on a materialized view based on 
rules associated with roles? 
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• How can we avoid role conflicts if user is gaining authorization for permissions 
associated with conflicting roles? 
1.6 - Thesis Contribution 
 
My contributions in this thesis are: 
• A fine-grained access control framework to prevent unauthorized access of 
materialized views  
• Users are assigned to roles, and users acquire permissions through authorization 
views 
• Provides a column level restriction based on an assigned role 
• Enforces constraints to avoid role conflicts 
• The proposed framework can be implemented for materialized view sites in 
distributed environments and for data warehouses 
1.7 - Organization of thesis 
 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II provides the background 
literature review of different proposed models which extend Role-Based Access Control 
approach and data authorization techniques using authorization views.  The details of this 
thesis research are provided in Chapter III that includes proposed framework, workflows 
diagrams, and the steps that each module performs in the entire role-based data 
authorization process. The details of implementation and verification of proposed 
framework along with the final results are provided in Chapter IV. Finally, Chapter V 
concludes our contribution and provides recommendations for future work.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
RELATED WORK 
In this chapter, we will discuss about the approaches and models proposed to control the 
access of data. In first three sections, we discuss some existing access control models 
which are the extension of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). In next three sections, 
we discuss the proposed techniques to build authorization views at the database level 
instead of specifying the authorization policies in the application code, which has 
numerous drawbacks. In the last section, we discuss recent papers [2][3] which introduce 
Datalog based syntax to build the authorization views to control the access of 
materialized views. 
2.1 - Context Based Access Control (CBAC) 
 
RBAC grants access on the basis of the role regardless of the context of the request. In 
CBAC the request is granted by verifying the context of the request.  
Toninelli et al. [22] propose a “Semantic Context-Aware Access Control Policy Model”. 
The authors state that they adopt a resource-centric approach to context modeling; 
contexts are associated with resources to be controlled and represent only those 
conditions that enable access to the resources. According to the authors, access control 
policies define for each context how to operate on the associated resource. The authors 
describe that the context consist of characterization information which is considered 
relevant for access control such as load, the entity operation on the resource, roles, 
identities and security credentials, and surrounding environment conditions, such as time, 
location, and other available resources.  
Kulkarni et al. [13] introduce a Context-aware RBAC (CRBAC) model that is an 
extension of RBAC. According to the authors, in NIST RBAC model roles are assigned 
by the administrator, and in such systems roles have a long life time. In CRBAC model, 
roles are defined as part of application’s design, and roles come to in existence only when 
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the application is deployed and executed. A person's context is defined in terms of his/her 
current physical location, devices being used, network on which the devices are 
connected, and the activities in which the user is currently engaged. 
Feng et al. [8] propose TCAC “A Trust and Context based Access Control Model for 
open and distributed systems”. According to the authors, role assignment is based on the 
trustworthiness and context information of the requestors. The authors state that if the 
trust value is not less than the set threshold value defined by the system policies, and the 
user context information satisfies the context constrains, the user is assigned a role and 
can perform the operations associated with assigned role. The authors state that context 
constraints which are considered in their model such as time and location of the user. 
2.2 - Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) 
 
In ABAC, data access is granted on the basis of three attributes: Subject Attributes, 
Resource Attributes, and Environment Attributes. 
Cruz et al. [5] propose “A Location Aware Role and Attribute Based Access Control 
System” by extending the role-based access control (RBAC) model for the dynamic 
association of roles with users. The authors state that in their framework privileges 
associated with resources are assigned depending on the attribute values of the resources, 
attribute values associated with the users determine the association of users with 
privileges, and a location mapping function between physical and logical locations allows 
to enable/disable roles depending on the logical location of the users and thus preserve 
the privacy of the location. The authors define their Access Model in which constraints 
can be defined on the attribute values of resources or users. 
Finin et al. [7] introduce a model ROWLBAC “Representing Role Based Access Control 
in OWL”. The authors state that their work defines the relationship between Web 
Ontology Language (OWL) and the Role Based Access Control (RBAC). In addition, 
they further examine and assess OWL’s suitability for two other access control problems: 
supporting attribute based access control and performing security analysis in a trust-
management framework. According to authors, in their approach role hierarchies are 
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represented by OWL class hierarchies, member get more privileges as one moves up the 
hierarchy, while in class hierarchies, classes get more attributes as user move down. The 
authors state that access constraints are based on general attributes of an action, including 
constraints on its subject and object. The authors further state that this provides general 
support to a more general model of attribute-based access control. 
2.3 - XML Based Access Control  
 
EXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) is one of the well know XML 
formats for Access control. XACML is a general purpose access control policy language, 
and it provides syntax to enforce access control policies which help in managing 
authorization decisions. The policies defined by XACML decide whether to authorize 
access to data and at what extend. In addition, it provides an architecture that supports the 
services with the help of two enforcement entities or modules: Policy Enforcement Point 
(PEP) and Policy Decision Point (PDP).  
XACML architecture consists of four components: The Policy Administration Point 
(PAP), Policy Decision Point (PDP), Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), and Policy 
Information Point (PIP). The PAP creates polices evaluated by the PDP. The PDP 
evaluates the policies against the incoming requests and sends the results to PEP. The 
PEP performs access controls on the basis of the authorization decision provided by the 
PDP. Finally, the PIP provides attributes values provided by the PDP during the policy 
evaluation process. Component that receives and dispatches all the information between 
these components is called Context Handler that performs as a mediator. Figure 2.1 
represents XACML data flow. 
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Fig 2.1: XACML data flow (http://www.informit.com) 
Joshi et al. [10] propose a framework X-RBAC “an XML-based access control policy 
specification language” that extends NIST RBAC, and it provides a framework for 
specifying mediation policies in a multi-domain environment and extends RBAC with 
temporal constraints, role attributes, contextual conditions, a notion of role states, and 
preconditions of state transitions. According to the authors, X-RBAC provides a wide 
range of protection granularity for protected data and supports policy mapping in multi-
domain environments. Figure 2.2 represents X-RBAC model. 
 
Fig 2.2: RBAC Model and X-RBAC Policy Components [Joshi et al. [10] page 41] 
 
18 
 
2.4 - Access Authorization for Relational Database 
 
Motro [15] proposed a model for relational database. According to author, “in this model 
access permissions are a form of database knowledge, from which access permissions 
that apply to specific requests are inferred”. There are three basic principles of this 
model: 
1) Database access is specified in terms of views: a set of authorization views are 
defined in order to control the access of data, and each user is granted permissions 
based on the available views.  
2) A user queries sends to the actual database, not at any particular view. 
3) When the request is sent to the database system, the system checks the available 
views of the request that could be the views of views which the user has access 
permissions. 
According to the author, the model represents the definition of views in special “meta-
relations”, and extents algebraic operators to these relations. 
Example of the authorization process of the proposed model, 
Assume a user sends a request to retrieve the names and sponsors of large projects: 
retrieve(PROJECT.NUMBER, PROJECT.SPONSOR) 
where PROJECT.BUDGET ≥ 250,000 
 
Implementation of the above query with the following sequence of algebraic operations: 
1. A ← ϭ(BUDGET ≥ 250,000)(PROJECT) 
2. A  ← ΠNUMBER,SPONSOR(A) 
PROJECTʹ includes only tuples of views that Brown is authorized to access as defined in 
the following relation: 
PROJECTʹ 
VIEW NUMBER SPONSOR BUDGET 
PSA * Acme* * 
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Now the same operations that are applied to the database relations are applied to their 
meta-relation: 
1. Aʹ ← ϭ(BUDGET ≥ 250,000)(PROJECTʹ ) 
2. Aʹ  ← ΠNUMBER,SPONSOR(Aʹ ) 
The selection retains only those view tuple which are unmodified, and the final projection 
is: 
Aʹ 
NUMBER SPONSOR 
* Acme* 
 
The above mask indicates that the user is restricted to projects sponsored by Acme, and 
following view definition will inform the user that permission exists only for SPONSOR 
= Acme.  
permit (NUMBER, SPONSOR) 
where SPONSOR = Acme  
 
2.5 - Fine-grained Authorization Policies 
 
Rizvi et al. [20] proposed a fine-grained access control model based on authorization 
views that allow “authorization-transparent” querying in which queries can be written 
against the database relation without referring to the authorization views. According to 
the authors, in their approach user queries can be written in terms of database relation, 
and the query is valid only if it can be answered using the available authorization views. 
The authors state that they have introduced a new notion of validity and conditional 
validity check in their proposed framework.  
According to the authors, their model is based on six key features as follows: 
1. Access control is specified using the authorization views. A view can be a traditional 
relational view or a parameterized view. According to the authors, a parameterized 
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authorization view is like the normal view, but there are some additional parameters 
such as user-id, time and user-location appearing in its definition. 
create authorization view MyGrades as 
Select * from Grades where student-id = $user-id 
 
2. Queries can be written in an authorization-transparent manner against the database 
relations without having referred to the authorization views. 
3. A query q is unconditionally valid if there is an equivalent query qʹ and both the 
queries give the same result of all database states. 
4. Certain queries can be answered using the available set of authorization views, even if 
they cannot be rewritten using the views. 
5. Conditionally valid queries that can be answered using the information contained in a 
set of authorization views in a given database state. 
6. Set of powerful inference rules which check the unconditional and conditional 
validity of queries. 
2.6 - Authorization Views and Conditional Query Containment 
 
Zhang et al. [25] proposed an algorithm that tests conditional containment of conjunctive 
queries respect to a set of materialized conjunctive views. According the authors, they 
identified the problem of ∏            .The authors state that based on their algorithm, 
they test if the query is conditionally authorized given a set of materialized authorization 
views. 
According to the authors, they adopt the definition of Rizvi et al. [20]: a query is 
conditionally valid to a set of views V and a set of materialized views MV for all 
database states where the values of the views V agree with MV, q agrees with qʹ. 
The authors define the conditionally contained query, conditionally empty query, and 
conditionally authorized query in the following definitions: 
Definition 1 - For any two queries Q1 and Q2, 
Q1 is said to be conditionally contained in Q2 with respect to V and MV, 
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denoted by Q1 ⊆V, MV Q2, if for every d in D, Q1(d) ⊆Q2(d). 
Q1 is said to be conditionally equivalent to Q2 with respect to V and MV, 
denoted by Q1≡V, MV Q2, if Q1 ⊆V, MV Q2 and Q2 ⊆V, MV Q1. 
 
Definition 2 - A query Q is conditionally empty with respect to V and MV if Q(d) us 
empty for every d in D. 
 
Zhang et al. [25] states that their approach first initiates the parameterized views by 
extracting the parameter values associated with the user and the session, before declaring 
whether a query should be conditionally authorized  
 
Definition 3 - A query Q is conditionally authorized with respect to authorization views 
V and materialized views MV, if there is a query Qr, that is written using only the views 
in V, and that is conditionally equivalent to Q. 
 
2.7 - Access Control to Materialized Views 
 
In previous sections, we have discussed some of the data access control techniques which 
are being utilized by the organizations based on organizational requirements. Bahloul et 
al. [3] proposed an approach to control the access of materialized views. The authors 
identified the problem of automatically generating the access control rules for 
materialized views based on the access control rules defined over the base relations. The 
authors adopt the technique of authorization views in order control the access of 
materialized views.  
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Fig 2.3: Authorization policies for materialized views ( Bahloul et al. [2]) 
The authors propose the use of Datalog syntax for defining the access control rules. The 
authors assume the existence of three types of symbols: variables, constants and predicate 
names. p(t1….tn) is a literal where p is a predicate name with arity n and each ti for 1≤ i ≤ 
n is either a constant or a variable.  
 
According to the authors, the logical sentence associated with the Datalog rule 
P(u) ← q1(u1),…,qn(un) is: 
∀x1..xn(p(u1) ← q1(u1) ^…^ qn(un)). 
 
Bahloul et al. [3] states that the relations defined by deductive rules are called intentional 
relations. For example, 
Info-Doc (Id-D, Dname, Dfname, Dspeciality) ←  
doctor (Id-D, Dname, Dfname, Dadr, Dphone, Dspeciality, 
Dsalary) 
 
is a rule that defines the (intentional) Info-Doc relation in terms of the (extensional) 
doctor relation. 
 
In the following example, the authorization views are defined to control the access of 
hospital database. 
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Hospital database: 
doctor (IdD, Dname, Dfname, Dadr, Dphone, Dspecialty, Dsalary). 
nurse (IdI, Snum, Nname, Nfname, Nadr, Nphone, Nsalary). 
Authorization views: 
av1 (IdD, Dname, Dfname, Dspecialty) ← doctor (IdD, Dname, Dfname, Dadr, Dphone, 
Dspecialty, Dsalary) 
av2 (IdI, Snum, Nname, Nfname) ← nurse (IdI, Snum, Nname, Nfname, Nadr, Nphone, 
Nsalary) 
In order to determine what data are accessible for each intentional relation mv in MV, the 
first step is authorization view selection. According to the authors, they utilize a query 
rewriting technique build on the Bucket algorithm that rewrites user query based on the 
available authorization views.  
The authors state that they modified the original Bucket algorithm [18] as if they utilize 
the original algorithm then the authorization view will be considered irrelevant. For 
example, (1) shown below is a materialized view definition. The authorization view (2) 
defines the tuples x, y which a user has right to access. 
mv(x,y,z) ← r(x,y,z) (1) 
av(x,y) ← r(x,y,z) (2) 
In the original Bucket algorithm, the attribute ‘z’ appears in the sub-goal of the query and 
also in the head of the query, then it must also be in the head of the view. According to 
the authors, it is too strict as one can project out ‘z’ by generating the appropriate 
authorization view on mv. 
In 2012, they authors propose the use of MiniCon algorithm [18] for query rewriting with 
their previous approach. According to the authors, this algorithm is more efficient in 
terms of matching tuples with the set of available authorization views. 
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2.8 - Comparison of Various Research Works 
 
Year Author Proposed work Access 
control 
approach 
Rule 
specificati
on 
language 
Domain of 
accessed 
data 
Contributio
n 
Implementation 
2004 Shariq Rizvi Extending Query 
Rewriting 
Techniques for 
Fine -Grained 
Access Control 
 
Rule-based SQL Generic Gives a 
powerful set 
of inference 
rules to 
check for 
query 
validity 
 
Not addressed 
 
2010 Alfredo 
Cuzzocrea 
Effectively and 
Efficiently 
Selecting Access 
Control Rules on 
Materialized 
Views over 
Relational 
Databases 
 
Rule-based Datalog Generic Introduces 
Datalog 
based syntax 
for 
expressing 
rules, and 
VSP-Bucket 
algorithm for 
query 
rewriting 
 
Not addressed 
 
2011 Sarah Nait-
Bahloul 
Access Control 
to Materialized 
Views: an  
Inference-Based 
Approach 
 
Rule-based Datalog Generic Ensures 
confidentialit
y of 
materialized 
views based 
on basic 
access 
control rules 
 
Not addressed 
 
2012 Sarah Nait-
Bahloul 
Authorization 
Policies for 
Materialized 
Views 
 
Rule-based Datalog Generic Presents S-
MiniCon 
algorithm, an 
adaptation of 
a query 
rewriting 
algorithm to 
the security 
context 
 
Not addressed 
 
2013 Hassaan 
Yousafi 
A Role-Based 
Access Control 
Schema for 
Materialized 
Views 
 
Role + Rule 
-based 
Datalog Generic Presents a 
fine-grained 
access 
control 
model based 
on  roles for 
materialized 
views 
 
Open source 
technologies 
Table 2.1: Comparison of various researches works 
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CHAPTER III 
 
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
In this chapter, we present the details of our proposed framework “A Role-Based Access 
Control Schema for Materialized Views”. We present an architecture that enables 
organizations to define and manage data access control authorizations for materialized 
views based on roles. This thesis introduces a role-based access control schema for 
materialized views in which rules are associated with roles, a column level restriction is 
imposed on a materialized view based on a user assigned role, and a role conflicting 
strategy is defined if the user is gaining authorization for permissions associated with 
conflicting roles. In this proposed framework, we focus on open source Database 
Management Systems such as MySQL and PostgreSQL as the open source databases 
don’t provide any automated process to enforce authorizations on Materialized Views.  
The proposed framework can also be applied to other relation databases as authorization 
views are defined by keeping in view the structure of materialized view tables defined in 
relational databases. 
3.1 - Data Access Control to Materialized Views 
 
A materialized view records query results (or simply a view) into a physical table that can 
be stored, and the user can then query a materialized view in the same manner as 
querying a database. Materialized views can be used for performance reasons in very 
large systems such as data warehouses or distributed systems, or for providing a filtered 
selection of data from a more general database. Existing proposed techniques provide 
rule-based access control for materialized view, but to the best of our knowledge, the 
administration of such systems is time consuming and cumbersome in a large 
environment as administrators define rules for each user to control the access to 
materialized views.  
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In this thesis, we extend the earlier work proposed by Bahloul et al. [3] that defines 
authorization policies in Datalog as a formal framework for expressing the access control 
rules (Abiteboul et al. [1]). In this thesis research, we define the authorization policies for 
roles instead of defining these policies for individuals. In second chapter, we discuss the 
details of related works which defines data authorization policies at the database level 
such as parameterized authorization views (Rizvi et al. [20]), and we have also discussed 
the recent work of Bahloul et al. [3] that defines authorization views in Datalog syntax.  
3.2 - Proposed Role-Based Framework 
 
The proposed architecture presents a new approach to define data access control 
authorizations for Materialized Views. We have identified the administrative problems of 
defining and modifying the data access control rules for materialized views in large 
organizations where thousands of employees perform their duties. Existing proposed 
techniques provide rule-based access control for materialized views; however, the 
administration of such systems is time consuming and cumbersome in a large 
environment where administrators define rules for each user to control the access to 
materialized views. 
In our approach, we utilize the existing Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [24] model 
that is proposed by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 1992. The 
RBAC model is currently the widely used model among all other existing models due to 
its dynamic nature and ease of administration.  
In RBAC, the access to organizational resources is granted on the bases of the user 
assigned role. When a role is assigned to a user, all the privileges associated with that role 
are also granted to the user. In the first chapter, we have discussed RBAC in detail.  
In our proposed framework, we define authorization views for each role. The 
authorizations are defined in Datalog syntax. The authorization views that are defined for 
materialized views provide column-level restrictions.  
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DB1
DB2
IdD
1
2
-
-
-
-
-
Dname
ABC
XYZ
-
-
-
-
-
Dfname
DEF
XXX
-
-
-
-
-
Dphone
519
226
-
-
-
-
-
Dspeciality
Cardiologist
Hygienist
-
-
-
-
-
Dsalary
 1,00,000
 1,50,000
-
-
-
-
-
Materialized View
Authorization
Views
Role
Attributes
User
Sessions
session_roles
Fig 3.1: Proposed RBAC Architecture for Materialized Views 
In figure 3.1, a materialized view is created by joining two tables from two different 
databases, and the view is deployed in a local database on a distributed site. As the 
proposed architecture depicts, the authorization views are associated with user assigned 
role, and the user profile attributes are extracted during the role assignment process.  
These attributes are extracted from database table where user profile attributes such as 
username, department name, user role, and other attributes are stored. The attributes are 
used for authentication and role assignment.   
In our proposed framework, we also maintain the session_roles, as we have noticed 
during our thesis research that a user can be assigned multiple roles such as a Project 
Manager can also work as a Programmer same time. So keeping in view the multiple role 
assignment, we allow a user to open multiple session_roles. We provide the detail of the 
session_roles in section 3.2.3. 
As we allow users to open multiple accounts in the same session, we also need to keep 
track of Role Conflict that occurs due to the conflict of interest between two roles. A user 
has to deactivate one session in order to activate another conflicting session_role. We 
discuss role conflicts in detail in section 3.2.4. 
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3.2.1 - Role Assignment 
 
The Role Assignment process starts after the authentication process, if the user 
credentials such as Username and Password are valid then the process proceeds further. 
Figure 3.2 represents the work flow of role assignment process. 
Emp_info (U, D, R, Sid)
U = ASU
ActiveSessions (ASU, ASD, ASR, ASid, ASUrl)
Role Conflict
(ASD = CD)
ASR = CR
Open activeSession (ASUrl) 
Conflict strategy
CD( CR, RP)
Deactivate 
(ASD, ASR)
D=ASD, R=ASR
Attributes 
matched
Sid = ASid
Assign session_role (U, D, R, Sid)
NO
YES
NO
YES
1
2
SessionID 
matched
NO
YES
RP
NO
YES
Deactivate previous session
(ASU, ASD, ASR)
 User Attributes
 U Username
 D Department
 R Role
 Sid Session ID
 Active Users Session Attributes
 ASU Active session username
 ASD Active session user department
 ASR Active session user role
 ASid Active user session ID
 ASUrl Active session URL
 Conflict Strategy Attributes.
 CD Conflicting department
 CR Conflicting role
 RP Role priority
1
2
3
4
5
6
 
Fig 3.2: Workflow of Role Assignment process 
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Once the user credentials are verified then the process checks the already active sessions.  
Active Session is a table where all active user sessions’ information is stored.  
We describe the above workflow in the following six steps as represented in figure 3.2: 
1. The process checks if the user information already exists in the active_session 
table. If the user information doesn’t exist in the active_session table then the user 
information (i.e. username, department, and role) that is extracted from database 
based on user credentials (i.e. username, password) is sent to role assignment 
module where the role is assigned to the user. Otherwise, if the user session 
information exists then the user attributes are matched with the already existing 
user session attributes. If the attributes are matched with one of already active 
sessions then it is considered that the user is already an active user with the same 
role.  
 
2. If the user is already an active user, then the user session ID is checked, if the 
session ID is matched with active role session ID then the user is redirected to the 
same session, otherwise, if the session ID is different, the process deactivates 
already active session and proceeds to the role assignment process. 
 
3. If the user session attributes are not matched with already active user session 
except the username as described in step 1, then it is considered that the user is an 
active user with a different role. In this case, role conflict is checked by extracting 
the attributes defined in role conflict strategy with already active user sessions’ 
attributes.  
 
4. If the role conflict exists after analyzing the role conflict strategy then the role 
priority is further checked. Role priorities are defined in conflict strategies. If the 
priority is ‘1’ then the already existing conflicting session is deactivated without 
notifying the user, and the new user proceeds to role assignment process. If the 
priority is ‘2’ then a notification is sent with conflicting role information to the 
user that a role conflict exists, and in order to activate a new session_role, user 
must deactivate the conflicting session_role. 
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5. After deactivating the conflicting session_role, the user can proceed to role 
assignment process as represented in figure 3.2. 
 
6. If the role conflict doesn’t exist as described in step 4, then the user is assigned a 
role that is based on user credentials. 
3.2.2 - Role-Based Authorizations 
 
In our proposed framework, the authorization to access a materialized view is based on 
user role. Figure 3.3 represents Role-Based Authorization architecture. 
Request handler
Role
conflict
strategy
Authorization Views
AV1(EID, Ename, Ephone)
AV2(EID, Designation)
User profile
attributes
Role
assignment
Rule
selection
Interpreter
Query 
Generator
User
MV
 
Fig 3.3: Architecture of Role-Based Authorization 
The process starts with role assignment, user attributes are extracted based on user 
credentials which user provides during the login process. The following example 
describes the above architecture. 
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Example: 
Once a user is assigned a role after going through the Role Assignment process as 
discussed in previous section, the user query is sent to the Request Handler. 
The Request Handler sends the materialized view name as mentioned in the user query to 
the Rule Selection module.  
The Rule Selection module searches for the given materialize view name in the 
associated authorization views file of user assigned role. If the materialized view name 
is found in the list of authorized views, the Rule Selection process extracts the 
authorized view information and returns it to the Request Handler. 
The Request Handler sends the authorized view to the Interpreter. 
The Interpreter extracts the column names from the given authorized view and sends it to 
the Query Generator. 
The Query Generator module generates the query on the basis of the provided column 
names and materialized view name, and returns it to the Request Handler. 
The Request Handler further sends the query to database system and returns the results to 
user. 
We use an existing approach to define authorization views proposed by Bahloul et al. [3]. 
In the following example, the authors define the authorization views to control the access 
of hospital database. 
 
Example: 
 
Hospital database: 
doctor (IdD, Dname, Dfname, Dadr, Dphone, Dspecialty, Dsalary). 
nurse (IdI, Snum, Nname, Nfname, Nadr, Nphone, Nsalary). 
 
32 
 
Authorization views: 
av1 (IdD, Dname, Dfname, Dspecialty) ← doctor (IdD, Dname, Dfname, Dadr, 
Dphone, Dspecialty, Dsalary) 
av2 (IdI, Snum, Nname, Nfname) ← nurse (IdI, Snum, Nname, Nfname, Nadr, 
Nphone, Nsalary) 
In the above example, there are two parts of authorization view. The left hand side 
defines the body of an authorization view, and the right hand side defines a complete 
definition of a materialized view from which an authorization view is derived. The body 
of an authorization view is used to define the authorizations for a particular user. In our 
proposed framework, we define the authorization views for roles as represented in figure 
3.4. 
User
Authorization Views
AV1(EID, Ename, Ephone)
AV2(EID, Designation)
Role
 
Fig 3.4: Role and Authorization Views 
3.2.3 - Session Roles 
 
In our proposed framework, we use Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model proposed 
by NIST. RBAC is used by majority of organizations due to its dynamic nature and ease 
of administration. Three primary rules are defined for RBAC: 
1. Role assignment: A user can access the resources only if he/she has selected or 
been assigned a role. 
2. Role authorization: User active role must be authorized to the user. 
3. Permission authorization: A user can access the resources only if the permission is 
authorized to the user’s active role. 
RBAC specifications: 
 User Assignment = UA ⊆ USERS X ROLES, a many-to-many mapping user to 
role assignment relation. 
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 Permission Assignment = PA ⊆ PREMS X ROLES, a many-to-many mapping 
permission to role assignment relation. 
 session_users (s: SESSIONS) → USERS, the mapping of session s onto the 
corresponding user.  
 session_roles (s: SESSIONS) → 2
ROLES
, the mapping of session s onto a set of 
roles.  
 
A user may open multiple simultaneous sessions with different roles and permissions. In 
our proposed framework, we follow the above rules and also allow user to open multiple 
simultaneous sessions. A user can open multiple sessions with different role, and each 
concurrent session authorizes a user to access the views based on an assigned role. Each 
session extracts user attributes (i.e. username, department, and role) that are passed 
through a generic URL to the Request Handler after Role Assignment. When a user sends 
a query, the Request Handler extracts the attributes and authorizes the user to view the 
records of a requested materialized view based on the available authorization view that is 
defined in authorized views file associated with user role within a particular department.  
3.2.4 - Role Conflicts 
 
In previous section, we discuss multiple simultaneous sessions which allow users to open 
multiple sessions with different roles and permissions. But we also need to restrict users 
to avoid role conflicts. Role conflict defines that no individual can assume the power of 
two or more conflicting roles at the same time. Role conflicts occur when individuals 
have various conflicting responsibilities  
RBAC introduces Separation of Duties (SoD) that restricts users to perform duties in 
confliction roles at the same time by enforcing the constraints. 
We take an example of finance system in which user has access to the billing system 
through a “Finance Billing” role, and he also has access to the payment system through 
the “Finance Paying” role. In this case, user cannot activate both the roles at the same 
time. User has to deactivate one session in order to activate the other session. 
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In our proposed framework, we introduce Conflict Strategies which are associated with 
user role same as the authorization views to avoid any role conflict. In our proposed 
conflict strategy, we introduce role priority.  
If a role conflict occurs during the role assignment process, the system checks the priority 
of the role that is defined in the conflict strategy by the administrator. We describe the 
conflict strategy as follows. 
After identifying the role conflict between two roles, the conflict strategy is defined in the 
following manner. 
Department (Role, Priority) 
The conflict strategy is defined in a text file associated with each role. During the Role 
Assignment process as we discuss in previous section. The Request Handler checks 
already activated session_roles of the same user with different roles. It extracts the 
attributes of the active session_roles one by one, and matches with the attributes defined 
in conflict strategy (i.e. department, role). If the attributes are matched then it is 
considered a role conflict. In this case, the Request Handler checks for the role priority 
defined in the conflict strategy. If the priority is ‘1’ then the system activates the new 
session_role and deactivates the previous session. If the priority is ‘2’ then the system 
sends a notification with the conflicting role attributes, and the user can activate the new 
session_role after deactivating the already active session_role. 
In the following example, we define conflict strategies for Finance Billing and Finance 
Paying roles which belong to Finance department.  
Username: Facello
Department: Finance
Role: Finance Billing
Username: Facello
Department: Finance
Role: Finance Paying
Finance (Finance Paying, 1)
Finance (Finance Billing, 2)
 
Fig 3.5: Role Conflict Strategies 
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In figure 3.5, user Facello is assigned two roles, but he cannot activate both roles at the 
same time. The role priorities are defined in the conflict strategy associated with both the 
roles. In the above scenario, the Finance Billing role is assigned first priority and Finance 
Paying role is assigned second priority.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
IMPLEMENTATION AND VERIFICATION  
4.1 - Background 
 
The main objective of this thesis research is to provide architecture to control the access 
of Materialized Views based on user roles. The case study is built on top of research done 
at the University of Windsor (Kent et al. [11] and Kobti et al. [12]) towards the creation 
of automated tools to conduct healthcare surveys, decision support system, and real-time 
data management system. In this research work, we identified the need of securing 
sensitive healthcare data. In our proposed framework, we present a Role-Based Access 
Control architecture in which authorizations are associated with user roles. Moreover, we 
introduce a mechanism to resolve role conflicts by defining role priorities in role conflict 
strategies which are also associated with user role same as authorization views. 
4.2 - Implementation 
 
In previous chapter, we discuss the steps involved in authentication, role assignment, and 
user authorizations in our proposed framework. In this section, we provide the details of 
implementation of our proposed framework. 
Request handler
Role
conflict
strategy
Authorization Views
AV1(EID, Ename, Ephone)
AV2(EID, Designation)
User profile
attributes
Role
assignment
Rule
selection
Interpreter
Query 
Generator
User
MV
 
Fig 4.1: Proposed Architecture 
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In the proposed framework, we focus on open source Database Management Systems 
(DBMS) as the open source DBMS doesn’t provide any automated process to regulate 
the access of Materialized Views. In the implementation of our proposed framework, we 
use MySQL database, the internal structure of our application is developed in PHP, and 
the User Interface (UI) is developed in HTML and CSS. 
4.2.1 - Role Assignment Module 
 
Role Assignment is a process to assign a role to the user based on the credentials that a 
user provides during the authentication process. Before a role is assigned, a user has to 
pass few checks in order to avoid any role conflicts and duplication of session_roles. In 
previous chapter, we explain a complete workflow of Role Assignment module. In this 
section we provide pseudo code of this module.  
Role Assignment Module 
CHECK if the user is already an active user 
IF user exists in Actives_Sessions 
  
 EXTRACT user Active_Sessions attributes  
   
 IF user attributes match with any Active_Sessions  
  CHECK for SessionID 
   IF SessionID match with current user SessionID 
    REDIRECT user to same Session_Role 
   ELSE 
    Deactivate ActiveSession role  
    Activate new Session_Role 
 BREAK    
  
CHECK Role Conflict with existing Session_Roles in ActiveSessions 
  
 EXTRACT attributes of ActiveSessions 
 EXTRACT Conflict_Strategy of current role 
  
 IF any of ActiveSessions role match with role defined in Conflict_Strategy for current user 
  CHECK for the role priority defined in Conflict_Strategy 
   IF Priority is 1 
    Deactivate ActiveSession role 
    Activate current role 
   IF Priority is 2 
    Send an alert with conflicting role information 
 BREAK 
 
Fig 4.2: Role Assignment module pseudo code 
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4.2.1.1 - Active Sessions 
 
In Active Sessions table, we store user information (i.e. username, role, department, 
sessionID, and session URL) whenever a user login to the system. The information 
available in this table is extracted during the role assignment process in order to match 
user active roles and current role attributes to avoid any role conflict and duplication of 
session_roles. The session ID is stored in order to prevent a user to activate multiple 
sessions for same session_role from different system. A user cannot open a session_role 
from two different session IDs at the same time. If a user tries to activate a session_role 
which is already in active session list then the system deactivates the existing 
session_role, and creates a new entry in active sessions with new Session ID. In this way, 
we can track user’s activities.  
We extract user’s active session’s information by calling activeSession function.  
Active Sessions 
function activeSession (username) { 
 EXTRACT username, role, department, session_id, url from active_sessions 
  WHERE username ==  username 
 IF found 
  Store user ActiveSessions attributes in an ARRAY 
  Return ARRAY  
 ELSE 
  Return NULL 
} 
Fig 4.3: Active Sessions pseudo code 
4.2.2 - Request Handler Module 
 
The Request Handler processes all users’ request once a user is assigned a role. It 
receives users’ request and sends it to the View Selection module. Before processing a 
user request, the Request Handler verifies that the user still exists in Active Sessions. If 
the user is still an active user, the Request Handler confirms that the user Session ID 
matches with the existing Session ID in Active Sessions. If it so then it processes user’s 
39 
 
request, otherwise, it deactivates user session_role and redirects the user to the login 
page. The Request Handler operates by the following steps: 
1. The Request Handler receives a user query, extracts the requested Materialized 
View name from the query, and sends it to the View Selection module. 
2. The View Selection module search for the requested Materialized View name in 
Authorization Views file that is associated with the user’s role. 
3. The View Selection module returns the Authorization View information to the 
Request Handler. 
4. The Request Handler sends the authorized view information to the Interpreter.  
5. The Interpreter extracts authorized column names from the authorization view and 
sends it to the Request Handler.  
6. The Request Handler sends the view name and the authorized columns name to 
the Query Generator. 
7. The Query Generator generates the query in SQL based on the provided 
information from the Request Handler, and sends the query to a database.  
8. The Request Handler receives the records from the Query Generator, and returns 
it to the user. 
4.2.2.1 - View Selection 
 
View Selection is a process to search and select an Authorization View based on a user 
selected Materialized View. View Selection process starts when a request is sent to the 
View Selection module from the Request Handler that contains a requested Materialized 
View name. In order to link the Authorization Views file that is associated to each role, 
the View Selection modules receives user’s attributes (i.e. department name and role) 
along with a Materialized View name from the Request Handler, and generates a path in 
order to link to Authorization Views file of user assigned role. 
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View Selection 
function ViewSelection (MaterializedView Name, Department Name, Role) { 
 Path to user Auhtorization Views file = "AuthorizationViews/department_name/role" 
               LOOP Search for MaterializedView in defined Authorization Views 
  IF found 
   Store AuthorizationView body information in an ARRAY 
   Return AuthorizationView 
  ELSE 
   Return NULL 
} 
Fig 4.4: View Selection pseudo code 
4.2.2.2 - Interpreter 
 
The Interpreter translates an Authorization View in SQL syntax. The Request Handler 
sends authorization view information that is returned by the View Selection module to 
the Interpreter. The authorization view is received in the following format. 
av1(emp_no,  first_name, last_name) 
The Interpreter removes the view name and the brackets that contain authorized column 
names from the given Authorization View, and returns the column names to the Request 
Handler in order to send it to the Query Generation module. 
emp_no,  first_name, last_name 
4.2.2.3 - Query Generation 
 
Query Generation is a process to generate a query in Sequential Query Language (SQL) 
syntax, and send it to the Request Handler in order to send the query to a database. The 
following architecture describes query construction process. 
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View Selection
Request Handler
User
MV Name
MV Name MV(emp_no, last_name, first_name)
Interpreter
MV(emp_no, last_name, first_name)
emp_no, last_name, first_name
Query Generator
MV Name
emp_no, last_name, first_name SELECT  emp_no, last_name, first_name from MV_Name
Step 1
S
tep
 2
Step 3
 
Fig 4.5: Query Construction  
In figure 4.5, the Query Generation module receives the materialized view name and 
column names from the Request Handler. The materialized view name and column 
names are assigned to the dynamic variables which are declared in Request Handler. The 
Request Handler passes the variables to Query Generator in order to construct a complete 
query. SQL SELECT and FROM clause is statically defined in query syntax and the 
dynamic variables are placed for column names and a view name. There are some other 
clauses that are used in SQL SELECT statement such as WHERE, GROUP BY, ORDER 
BY, and LIMIT which can be defined by the user through the options available in the 
user interface. The values of these additional SELECT clauses are also assigned to 
dynamic variables which are declared in Request Handler, and the Request Handler 
passes these values to the Query Generator along with MV name and column names.   
4.3 - Verification 
 
In order to test our proposed framework, we have implemented an application based on 
our proposed architecture. The application is developed in accordance with the 
specification described in Chapter 3. We discuss the implementation part in previous 
42 
 
section where we define steps that each module performs. In this section, we examine our 
application that we have developed to test and verify our proposed approach. 
4.3.1 - Basic Requirements 
 
The verification of basic requirements is to test the core elements of the application. In 
our thesis research, we are focused on providing architecture to authorize users to access 
the data based on their role. The Role Assignment process starts after the authentication 
process. A user needs to provide a valid username and password for authentication. 
Figure 4.6 represents login page. 
 
Fig 4.6: Login page 
After the authentication process, the user is redirected to the homepage. The following 
image represents the homepage.  
43 
 
 
Fig 4.7: Homepage 
Username, department, and the role of the user appear on the top right of the header 
section as in figure 4.7. There is a logout button available that deactivates user session 
and redirects user to the login page. The left panel down to the header is used to place 
Query Generator. A user can generate a query using the features available in Query 
Generator. There is a dropdown list available to select a materialized view. This 
dropdown list contains only those authorized views which are defined in authorization 
view file that is associated with user assigned role. There are some check boxes which are 
used to enable and disable additional SQL statement clauses, and ‘Display None’ feature 
is used for analysis purposes.  
The basic requirement of this framework is to restrict the user to view only those columns 
of materialized view which the user has authorization. The following image represents a 
simple query execution without mentioning any additional clauses. 
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Fig 4.8: Simple query execution and results 
In figure 4.8, user Facello selects a view emp_info from the dropdown list of views and 
executes the query without adding any additional clauses. The system returns only those 
columns information which the user authorized to view as defined for users’ assigned 
role in its associated authorization views file as below. 
Fig 4.9: Authorization Views 
In figure 4.9, the complete view definition is defined at the right side that contains six 
columns, but the user is not authorized to view the information of two columns (i.e. 
birth_date and hire_date) as defined at the left side. In Fig 4.8, the system returns the 
results based on the defined authorization view. 
In our proposed framework, we introduce role conflict strategies. A user can activate 
multiple session_roles simultaneously as a user can be working in multiple roles in same 
organization. We define conflict strategy to avoid any conflict of interest between two 
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roles as the conflicting roles cannot be activated at the same time by same user. In our 
proposed framework, we assign priorities to conflicting roles. The conflict strategy is 
associated with roles same as the authorization views. 
In chapter 3, we discuss role conflicts in detail with an example. In order to validate this 
requirement, we define role conflict strategy for ‘Finance Paying’ and ‘Finance Billing’ 
role in Finance department, and we assign both the roles to same user. The strategies are 
defined in following manner. 
 
 
Fig 4.10: Conflict Strategy 
In figure 4.10, a conflict strategy is defined for ‘Finance Billing’ and ‘Finance Paying’ 
roles in their associated role files as both the roles cannot be activated at the same time. 
The ‘Finance Billing’ role is given first priority and ‘Finance Paying’ role is at second 
priority. The user activates ‘Finance Billing’ role and at the same time the user wants to 
activate ‘Finance Paying’ role. As the ‘Finance Billing’ role is given first priority, 
therefore, the user gets the following message during the role assignment process and 
redirected to the Login page as represented in figure 4.11.  
 
Fig 4.11: Role conflict detected 
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If the user activates ‘Finance Paying’ role first and at same time the user activates 
‘Finance Billing’ role. In this case, the system deactivates ‘Finance Paying’ role without 
notifying to the user as the ‘Finance Billing’ role is given first priority. 
4.3.2 - Additional Functions 
 
There are some additional functions in our application. These functions enable users to 
filter the results coming from the database. The additional functions include the 
additional SQL statement clauses such as WHERE, GROUP BY, and ORDER BY. These 
features are available in Query Generator. The following figure represents the additional 
clauses available in the User Interface. 
 
Fig 4.12: Additional SQL statement clauses 
In figure 4.12, there are additional SQL statement clauses which a user can enable to 
filter the results. A user can enable them by clicking on the checkboxes available in each 
clause. The following figure represents query generation using the additional clauses. 
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Fig 4.13: Query Generation using SQL statement clauses 
Figure 4.13 represents Query Generation using additional SQL statement clauses, the 
user executes the query and the Request Handler returns the results based on 
authorization view defined for user assigned role as represented in figure 4.14. 
 
Fig 4.14: Results of query with additional SQL clauses 
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Apart from the additional SQL clauses, there is another additional features ‘Display 
None’ that is added in the User Interface for data analysis purpose. The Request Handler 
extracts the number records for a requested query, and if the number of records is less 
than the value defined in “Display None” field then the request handler returns a total 
number of rows. 
 
Fig 4.15: Query Generation using Display None function 
In figure 4.15, the ‘Display None’ function is enabled and in “rows less than” field, a 
value ‘2’ is given. In this case, the Request Handler doesn’t return any results if the 
number of records is less than two. The following figure represents the results after 
executing the query as mentioned in Fig 4.15. 
 
Fig 4.16: Results of query using Display None function 
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4.4 - Scalability Test Results 
 
NU = Number of users 
SARO = Number of Session Roles 
SARU  = Number of rules associated with roles 
 
Load  
NU SARO SARU RoleAssg 
time (secs) 
RuleSelection 
time (secs) 
QueryExecution 
time (secs) 
QueryResponse 
time (secs) 
15 21 234 0.95854 0.00126 1.59740 0.00050 
30 40 468 0.98607 0.00163 1.59740 0.00036 
45 57 520 1.07722 0.00140 1.50204 0.00035 
Table 4.1: Scalability test results 
4.5 - Summary Comments 
 
In this chapter, we have discussed the implementation of our proposed framework in 
detail. We have also validated our approach and presented the results. The proposed 
framework is not domain specific. It can be adopted by any organization which has huge 
number of employees working at different remote locations in a distributed environment. 
The organizations create Materialized Views database and deploy such databases at 
remote sites in order to ease the network load, and also to reduce load of the main 
database server. There is no such automated mechanism available in open source 
databases which can be utilized to control the access of Materialized Views locally at the 
remote sites. The proposed framework can be utilized for local Materialized View sites in 
a distributed environment.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this chapter, we conclude our proposed framework and discuss some areas for future 
work.  
5.1 - Conclusion 
 
This thesis work presents a framework to control the access of Materialized Views based 
on user role. The authorizations are associated with user role, and these authorizations are 
defined in Datalog syntax. Our work extends an earlier work proposed by Bahloul et al. 
[3]. The authors define authorization views for individual users to control the access of 
materialized views, but in our approach we define authorization views for roles. 
In our proposed framework, we utilize a Role-based access control approach specification 
that is proposed by National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST), and we 
authorize user to view the data based on an assigned role. We provide column based 
authorization on a requested Materialized View.  
In our proposed framework, we enable users to activate multiple session_roles 
simultaneously. In our thesis research, we identified that if two roles have conflict of 
interest then they cannot be activated at the same time. In order to avoid role conflicts, we 
introduce role conflict strategies, these strategies are associated with user role same as 
authorization views. In a role conflict strategy, the attributes are defined to enforce 
Separation of Duties (SoD), and conflicting roles are given priority to resolve role 
conflicts. 
In order to test our proposed architecture, we developed an application using the open 
source technologies (i.e. MySQL and PHP). The implementation is done in accordance 
with the basic requirement of our proposed architecture.  
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The results show that the application meets the basic requirements of our proposed 
framework which include defining authorization views for roles, provide column based 
authorizations, activation of multiple session_roles, detection of conflicting roles, and 
setting up priorities to resolve role conflicts.  
Our proposed framework is not domain specific; it is a generic framework and can be 
utilized in any domain.  
5.2 - Future Work 
 
We address some other potential areas which can be addressed in future work based on 
the experience gained in this thesis research. 
5.2.1 - Role Automation 
 
In this thesis research, we identified that the role automation is another important area of 
research. The role automation is required in big organizations where thousands of 
employees perform their duties. In such organizations to create, assign, and change the 
role of each employee is a time consuming process. Currently, a dedicated department 
such as Human Resources department assigns a role to each employee based on his/her 
job descriptions. The entire process is manually controlled; once a role is assigned to an 
employee by the concerned department, the system administrator creates a new entry in a 
database table or Access Control List (ACL) in which the employee profile attributes are 
stored.  
Future work includes a role automation process that assign roles to employees based on 
their job descriptions.  
5.2.2 - Workflow Management in RBAC 
 
In Role-based Access Control system, the chain of command (role hierarchies) should be 
defined clearly where top-most role is first in the command and the next in command is 
down one level and so on. Each role in the role hierarchy is assigned responsibilities such 
52 
 
as a Supervisor is responsible to submit the working hours of his subordinates. In this 
case, if the Supervisor is not available then it can delay the process.  
In order to avoid such delays, we need a mechanism that authorizes each role to transfer 
its responsibilities to next in the role hierarchy. The redirection of responsibilities to 
another role in the role hierarchy is supposed to be temporarily, and a time slot must be 
assigned during the transfer process. After the assigned time, the authorizations 
associated with the given responsibilities must be revoked by the system.  
Future work includes implementing and integrating role automation and workflow 
management system with our existing framework. 
5.2.3 - Global vs. Local Authorizations 
 
In our thesis research, we have presented a framework that enforces authorizations based 
on user assigned role on a local materialized view database. Future work includes 
extending our Role Authorization Framework that will allow user to access data from 
remote databases in a distributed environment based on authorization defined on local 
database (Local authorization views) and remote databases (Global authorization views). 
The local and global authorization must be analysed by the system before granting access 
to users. In order to resolve conflicts between both local and global authorization views, 
we need to design a strategy to resolve such conflicts. 
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